Russia on a euro drip. The EU imports gas and oil via ships and pipelines.
By Marek Grzybowski
Russia continues to profit from fossil fuel exports, and the EU is participating in financing the war. Russian gas imports to the EU fell by 70% in Q1 2025 compared to pre-invasion flows (Q1 2021). Pipeline gas deliveries declined by 90%. However, LNG imports increased by 67%, and EU terminals in many ports were operating at full capacity. The EU has paid Russia $105.6 billion for gas imports since the invasion of Ukraine began. This represents 75% of Russia’s entire military budget for 2024, according to CREA analysts.
The sanctions therefore backfired, and EU policy proved beneficial to Russia, many EU economies, and oil and gas producers, who stepped into the gap created by the suspension of energy imports from Russia. European Union seaports were significant beneficiaries of the sanctions and pipeline restrictions.
Russian LNG imports to the EU are steadily increasing, or remain stable in some markets. Import declines are occasionally recorded. “87% of all Russian LNG imports to the EU reached transshipment terminals in Spain, France, or Belgium in the first quarter of 2025,” reports Isaac Levi, noting that LNG arriving by tanker at these terminals from Russian wells does not necessarily remain in those countries.”

Gas from Russia to the EU Without Restrictions
– Although natural gas imports from Russia via pipelines began to decline in the summer of 2021, the volume of Russian LNG reaching European LNG terminals has remained unchanged to date, Bruegel analysts note in their study “European Natural Gas Imports.”
In the 21st week of 2025, total weekly gas imports continued to decline, driven by a decline in imports from Azerbaijan and Norway. It states that “gas flows to Ukraine remain above seasonal levels. LNG regasification has reached 92% of capacity in Italy and Croatia. EU gas storage refills are gaining momentum, and in week 21 of this year, 46% of storage capacity was filled,” Bruegel reports.
French regasification terminals recorded a 46% increase in imports to 7.7 billion cubic meters, while Dutch operators increased LNG imports by 81%, achieving transshipments of 1.7 billion cubic meters. Spanish terminals saw a 12% decrease in supply to 5.7 billion cubic meters. Operators using gas terminals in Belgium reduced imports by 21% to 5.1 billion cubic meters. This is just one piece of the puzzle, in which other fuels play a significant role in supporting Russia’s budget.
In April 2025, Russia’s monthly revenues from fossil fuel exports fell by 6% month-on-month, to €585 million per day, while export volumes increased slightly by 1%. This is the result of lower fossil fuel prices on global markets caused by a decline in demand. As recently as March 2025, Russia’s monthly revenue from fossil fuel exports increased by 1% month-on-month, reaching €637 million per day.
Nearly half (47%) of Russian oil exports in April were transported by G7+ tankers, a 4% increase compared to March of this year. Since January, the share of shadow tankers in the transport of Russian crude oil has decreased from 65% to 53%. In 2025, the use of shadow tankers to transport Russian crude oil will decline from 81% in January to 65% in April, according to CREA in its latest report. Already in March of this year, Russian crude transported by G7+ or insured vessels increased by 20% month-on-month.

Ports by country used by shadow fleets, source: Windward, 2025
The decline in European imports is being offset by purchases from other markets. China’s refineries and chemical plants are a significant beneficiary. Imports of Russian seaborne crude oil to China increased by 8% month-on-month to the highest level since October 2024.
“The increase in demand for Russian crude oil is primarily due to the decline in global oil prices in April and the use of this opportunity by Chinese refineries to increase their inventories,” explains Isaac Levi of CREA, calculating: “A lower price ceiling of $30 per barrel would result in a 40% decline in Russia’s oil export revenues (to €138 billion) from the start of EU sanctions in December 2022 to the end of April 2025. In April, a price ceiling of $30 per barrel would result in a 38% decline in Russia’s revenues (to €4.13 billion).
Crude Oil from Russia to China and India
In the first quarter of 2025, Russia’s seaborne crude oil exports to China and India increased by 42% and 41%, respectively. These were the highest volumes of Russian oil imported by both countries since October 2024 and July 2024, respectively. CREA emphasizes that “Boosted by increased supplies to Asian countries, Russian seaborne oil exports rose to their highest levels in the past six months.”
If the EU sanctions introduced in 2025 were consistently enforced, they would reduce Russia’s export revenues by 11% (€38.08 billion). In March 2025 alone, full enforcement of the price cap would reduce revenues by 8% (approximately €0.94 billion), according to Levi.
In April 2025, Russia’s monthly revenues from seaborne oil exports fell by 14% month-on-month to €204 million per day, while export volumes increased by 3%. Russian revenues from pipeline oil fell by 2% to €70 million per day. Russian revenues from liquefied natural gas (LNG) increased by 1% to EUR 40 million per day, and volumes increased by 7%, according to calculations by CREA experts.

Over €250 million per day to Russia for gas, oil, and coal
Revenues from pipelined gas decreased by 10% to €52 million per day, and pipeline gas export volumes also fell by 4%. Revenues from seaborne petroleum products fell by 14% month-on-month to €155 million per day. Meanwhile, Russian coal export revenues increased by 10% to €63 million per day.
Bulk carriers carrying coal were particularly busy on routes connecting Russian ports with Chinese bulk terminals. From December 5, 2022, to the end of April 2025, China purchased 44% of all Russian coal exports. India imported 19% of the coal Russia introduced to the global market, and terminals in Turkish ports received 11%. South Korea accounted for 10% of Russian coal imports, with Taiwan accounting for 5%.
China’s refineries and industrial customers acquired 47% of Russia’s crude oil exports. The next largest recipients were the petrochemical industries of India (38%), the EU (6%), and Turkey (6%). Petroleum products from Russia arrived via tankers in Turkey, which became the largest recipient of product tanker cargo. In April of this year, 26% of Russia’s petroleum product exports reached its terminals. China (13%) and Brazil (12%) were the next largest recipients.
The EU was the largest buyer of LNG, purchasing 50% of Russia’s LNG supplies to the global market. China also acquired significant cargoes delivered by LNG tankers, securing a 21% market share, while Japan was the third largest recipient with a 19% share. EU countries were also the leading buyer of pipeline gas, purchasing 37% of Russian gas. Importers from China (29%) and Turkey (27%) followed.
Gaps in Oil Trade
In April of this year, the EU saw a significant increase in the volume of LNG delivered to the global market. 352 vessels exported Russian crude oil and petroleum products, of which 135 were “gray fleet” tankers. Thirty-two percent of these vessels were at least 20 years old. The oldest tanker transporting Russian crude oil in April was over 30 years old, according to CREA.
It is noted that gray fleet tankers transport Russian crude oil and petroleum products without any significant obstacles through the exclusive economic zones of EU member states, territorial waters, or sea straits. This occurs despite the fact that they pose a significant environmental threat and often have questionable insurance and registration status. Questions are raised not only by the age of the vessels in operation, but above all by their technical condition and crew training.

In the vast majority of cases, it is assumed that their insurance does not provide sufficient protection and indemnity (P&I) to cover the costs in the event of an oil spill or other disaster. In the event of a disaster, coastal states could bear the entire financial burden of remediating environmental and other damages.
CREA calculates that “The cost of cleanup and compensation resulting from an oil spill from tankers with questionable insurance could exceed €1 billion, a financial burden borne by the taxpayers of coastal states.”
In April 2025, it was estimated that ship-to-ship (STS) transfers of Russian crude oil were taking place daily in EU waters. This oil was valued at €74 million per day. Over one-third of ship-to-ship transfers were from shadow vessels to G7+ tankers.

The EU is pumping euros into Russia
Recipients, and especially Russian suppliers, are benefiting from sanctions leaks. In April of this year, the five largest importers of Russian fossil fuels in the EU paid €1.2 billion. Also in March, the five largest Russian fossil fuel importing countries in the EU paid Russia a combined €1.2 billion for their imports, more than half of which were LNG purchases. The EU granted an exemption for Russian crude oil imported via the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. While Russian pipeline gas and LNG remain sanction-free, pipeline transit through Ukraine ended in December 2024, ending Gazprom’s gas supplies to Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Austria.
The EU has not yet imposed sanctions on imports, and natural gas accounts for over 70% of imports. Supplies flow via LNG tankers and pipelines. The remaining payments for fossil fuels were mainly made up of crude oil. It continues to be imported via Hungary and Slovakia. It also flows to the Czech Republic via the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline under an exception granted by the EU Commission.
Hungary was the largest importer, purchasing €373 million of Russian fossil fuels in April. This comprised crude oil (€197 million) and pipeline gas (€176 million). Similarly, in March of this year, Hungary was the largest importer, purchasing €412 million of Russian fuels. The proportions were different from April. Pipeline gas imported €228 million, and crude oil €184 million.
In March and April of this year, France was the second-largest importer of Russian fossil fuels in the EU. Imports (Russian LNG) totaled €371 million. CREA emphasizes that “the fact that this gas is imported through France does not necessarily mean that it is consumed there. A recent study indicates that some of the Russian LNG entering France through the Dunkirk terminal is delivered to Germany.” This is also evident in the imports recorded as early as March of this year. The value of imports for Russian LNG reached a total of €314 million.

Buyers of Fossil Fuels from Russia, source: CREA
Slovakia, the third-largest buyer in the EU, imported Russian fossil fuels worth €209 million in April and €165 million in March. Russian crude oil accounted for 61% of Slovakia’s imports, worth €155 million (in April) and €101 million (in March), while the remaining fossil fuels were pipeline gas, worth €54 million and €63 million, respectively. Russian crude oil is refined into petroleum products and re-exported to the Czech Republic. This is permitted by the EU Commission. Slovakia’s exemption from the export ban on petroleum products made from Russian crude oil, which expired in December 2024, has been extended until June 2025.
Belgium was the fourth-largest importer of fossil fuels in the EU by value, purchasing Russian LNG worth €153 million in March of this year and €175 million in April of this year. Spain imported LNG alone, worth €161 million in March of this year and €144 million in April of this year.
Leaky sanctions and exemptions mean that trade between European Union countries operates virtually without any restrictions in many areas. This is particularly visible in the oil and natural gas market. The petrochemical industries of many European Union countries are operating at full capacity, relying heavily on Russian crude oil.
