War and the Sea – From the Black Sea to the Baltic. Defenseless Ships and Blockaded Ports
“War and the Sea – From the Middle Ages to the Present Day” is the seventh international scientific conference held at the Naval Museum in Gdynia on August 21-22. The conference concluded on a high note. Professor Piotr Mickiewicz discussed the experiences of naval battles in the Black Sea from 2022 to 2024. These findings indicate that Russian ships have been virtually deprived of offensive operations, and Ukrainian ports have been blockaded. This is the shortest conclusion of an extensive and multifaceted analysis of military events in the Black Sea.
One significant conclusion is that “the defensive formula adopted by Ukraine can be adapted by Russia to plan a defensive operation in the Baltic Sea.” Professor Mickiewicz justifies this by stating that “Ukraine’s tactical successes, especially the use of drones, have prevented the lifting of the naval blockade due to the use of mines.”
Thus, to blockade Ukraine’s ports and the northwestern part of the Black Sea, it was not necessary to capture Snake Island. Permanent mine barriers, anchor mines, or bottom mines were not even necessary. It was enough for mines floating on the sea currents to flow into the routes leading to the seaports, and these were closed off. Scientists from the Naval Academy have predicted all Russian military operations in the Baltic Sea to date, which may also be offensive in nature.
The restoration of the Leningrad Military District in response to Finland and Sweden’s entry into NATO indicates that Russia is considering the possibility of war breaking out in northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region at the beginning of the next decade, according to a report from the Finnish National Defense University.
The Department of War Studies at the Finnish National Defence University explicitly states that “Russian forces may attempt to conduct ‘limited-scale surprise attacks’ on smaller NATO countries, in a belt stretching from northern Norway, through Finland, to the Baltic states, in order to ‘paralyze NATO’s decision-making process.'”
The Finns point to specific countries and forces of the Russian Federation that will be used for aggression: “For these operations, Russia may use its air force, navy, infantry, and landing units in the strength of several divisions. One scenario could also be an attempt to seize parts of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Sweden to secure the strategically important Murmansk region in the Arctic,” reports PAP.

Waters Blockaded by the Russian Navy, source: presentation by Prof. Piotr Mickiewicz. Conference “War and the Sea – From the Middle Ages to the Present Day”
The Baltic Sea as a Sea of (Dis)Peace
Such actions were predicted several years ago by Szubrycht, Rokiciński, and Mickiewicz, professors and officers from the Polish Naval Academy, who extensively discussed the issue in the chapter “The Baltic Region as a Zone of Fractures in the Theory and Practice of Hybrid Conflict” in their book “The Baltic Sea in Russia’s Security Policy.”
They clearly state that “Russians do not accept the term ‘hybrid warfare.'” The subsection concludes with the statement: “appropriately for each conflict waged by the Russian Federation, a doctrine will be developed, determined by (…) factors in various combinations, aimed at achieving the element of surprise…”
Prof. Piotr Mickiewicz, analyzing the situation in the Black Sea during the “War and the Sea” conference, noted an important point: “in the first stage of the battle, Russian forces gained full control of operationally important waters.” Therefore, “as a result of the blockade, Russia gained full control of operationally important waters.”
The Baltic Sea in NATO. Source: Nordregio.com
It should be noted that Russia has been more effective in pursuing its strategic goals at sea than all NATO and European Union countries combined, whose sanctions have proven ineffective in all maritime areas, shipping, maritime trade, and seaports, even among allied states.
In the Black Sea, however, the Russian Navy conducted Special Military Operations, which consisted of two forms of activity: “The first was the so-called maritime policy, which involves the use of force in two dimensions: coercive diplomacy (maritime coercion) and persuasion, and the second was strictly military action,” Professor Mickiewicz lists.
Observing the failure of the recent “peace talks,” we must ask whether, in building our maritime defense, we are ready to seal our maritime border and coastline? Is the security of the coast, communication routes, large and small ports, and installations in the Polish economic zone and on the coast ensured by our own and allied naval forces?
The Baltic Sea in NATO
In his book “Engineering Management of Modernization Programs in Naval Forces,” Dr. Bohdan Pac highlights many weaknesses in the organization of our naval defense, highlighting among them the operations of surface strike forces and submarines (actually one), as well as naval aviation. Pac also listed anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense as weaknesses, and considers the presence of floating logistics units as a weak element of naval defense. According to the author, the presence of floating logistics units is also a weak element of our naval defense.

The strategic location of Snake Island. Source: Presentation by Prof. Piotr Mickiewicz. Conference “War and the Sea – from the Middle Ages to the Present Day”
In this context, Prof. Mickiewicz’s conclusions drawn from his analysis of the situation in the Black Sea become relevant. One of the key findings is that “naval operations have demonstrated that control of the sea, or the denial of the use of the sea, is fundamentally determined by the possibility of complete control of air and underwater space.”
From this perspective, despite the loss of the guided missile cruiser Moskva, Russia maintained control of the waters around the Crimean peninsula and the coast of Ukraine. Recall that a Russian ship was sunk at the beginning of the war, on April 14, 2022. The ship was lost after being hit by R-360 Neptune missiles. According to Professor Mickiewicz, the Russians lost the flagship vessel of the Russian Black Sea Fleet as a result of a poorly executed or failed rescue operation. The ship sank as a result of a fire and subsequent ammunition explosion.
This last aspect is also crucial in constructing a defense system for sea areas, ports and the routes leading to them, as well as strategically important installations. Professor Mickiewicz Mickiewicz emphasizes that “the effectiveness of drone attacks determines the process of change not only in ships’ defense systems and tactics, but also in the combat training process [of ships’ crews – Ministry of Defence].”

Blockade of Black Sea ports with floating mines. Source: New York Post photo compsite
The conference “War and the Sea – from the Middle Ages to the Present Day” addressed various aspects related to the activities of the Polish Navy and other navies, as well as various human activities related to maritime warfare. The conference presented the results of scientific research on the history of human military activity on the seas and oceans, as well as the use of ports and rivers in combat. The conference was attended by scientists and experts from Poland, Great Britain, Sweden, Germany, Norway, Estonia, Spain, Italy, and Finland.
Topics discussed included: unknown episodes from the history of 20th-century naval warfare, including research on the use of the Pinsk Flotilla ships by the Soviet Army, medieval sources and war strategies, and Poland’s participation in international maritime remembrance projects. The special guest of the event was Professor Andrzej Wajda. Andrew Lambert, a world-class expert in naval history from King’s College London.
In the context of the above presentations, Professor Piotr Mickiewicz’s presentation once again confirms the saying that “history is the teacher of life.” Some of the presentations also highlighted the poor or ineffective use of ships and the maritime potential of states. It is therefore also worth noting that the political class and strategists are still not up to the challenges of the future. For “history is a cycle,” and the victims of these cycles are civilians and soldiers. As Maria Konopnicka wrote: “And in war, bullets whizz, People fall like sheaves, And kings strike bravely, And peasants perish most.” This also applies to the seas and oceans.

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